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The Jean Monnet Chair
The Jean Monnet Chair was created in 1988 by decision of the Academic 
Council of the European University Institute, with the financial support of 
the European Community. The aim of this initiative was to promote studies 
and discussion on the problems, internal and external, of European Union 
following the Single European Act, by associating renowned academics and 
personalities from the political and economic world to the teaching and 
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Independent Regulatory Commissions: 
Independent from Whom
The United States has experienced a very large number and broad range of 
“independent” agencies. That experience is usually interpreted, by Americans 
as well as others, as independence from one or more other government enti­
ties. The most prominent US independent agencies have been the large number 
of independent regulatory commissions, the alphabet of the ICC, FTC, FCC, 
SEC, CAB, FPC, NRC, etc., etc.1 The first of these was the Interstate 
Commerce Commission of 1888 and most of the rest are roughly modelled 
upon it. These commissions are regulatory in the sense that they conduct gov­
ernment interventions into the private economic sector designed to correct 
some market failure or other anomaly concerning which the private sector is 
allegedly not self-correcting. It is this sensitive intrusion, in a nation deeply 
committed to laissez-faire, that inspires the call for “independence”. It is hard 
enough that the government is driven to interfere with the market. God forbid 
that regular government should do so in regular ways. Driven by necessity, 
government action may be justified, but it must be purified government action.
The structural feature that unites the independent regulatory commissions is 
that they are commissions, that is multi-headed agencies. The commissioners, 
typically five to twelve in number, serve for a fixed term of years, often 
twelve and always more than four. They serve staggered terms, typically one 
or more leaving every two years. They are appointed by the President and 
must be confirmed by the Senate -  the same arrangement as for most of the 
executives of the Executive Branch. In short, the arrangement is that the 
President appoints, just as he does the heads of other federal agencies, but no 
given President in any four year term gets to appoint a majority of the com­
missioners of a given commission.
1 Because of frequently encountered misunderstandings in Europe, it should be added that 
neither OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Administration) nor E.P.A. 
(Environmental Protection Agency) are independent agencies. OSHA is a unit of the 
Department of Labor. E.P.A. is a cabinet department in all but name. Its director serves at 
the pleasure of the President and the agency’s organization and legal status is that of a 
regular executive branch agency. Congressional opponents of environmental regulation 
were able to deny it the symbolic prestige that the title “Department” carries, but it has no 





























































































It would appear then that independent means independent of the President. 
Certainly it doe snot mean independent of Congress. For the independent 
commissions bear exactly the same relation to Congress as the cabinet depart­
ments (ministries) and their subdivisions. All federal agencies, independent or 
otherwise, are created by Congressional statute and their missions assigned and 
defined by statute. All receive their money by annual Congressional 
appropriation. All are overseen by four, subject matter specialized, permanent 
Congressional committees: House and Senate “legislative” committees with ju­
risdiction over the making of the laws involving the agency and House and 
Senate Appropriations Committees. While it is often claimed that most of the 
Commissions receive relatively little Congressional attention most of the time, 
that inattention does not differentiate them from non-independent agencies. 
Congress, or rather particular Congressmen, pay attention to particular agen­
cies when, and only when, agency action or lack of action raises the opportu­
nity for politically advantageous Congressional intervention.
It also is sometimes said that the Commissions bear a special relation to 
Congress. The typical commission situation is that Congress has recognized the 
need for legislation but is reluctant to write detailed laws because the area in­
volved is one that is rapidly changing in unanticipatable ways or requires 
many hundreds or thousands of short-term decisions that must be constantly 
updated. The Federal Communications Commission and the Nuclear Regula­
tory Agency, for instance, were created at times in which government inter­
vention was obviously needed but the technology to be regulated was new, 
mysterious and rapidly developing. The ICC, the Federal Power Commission, 
the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Securities and Exchange Commission each 
was designed to approve thousands of constantly changing rates or transac­
tions. Because Congress was delegating its legislative authority to the Com­
missions in a rather open-ended way, Congress might be expected to maintain 
particularly close supervision. In this view the independent commissions ought 
to be less independent, of Congress at least, than the non-independent agencies. 
In fact, however, Congress has often engaged in rather sweeping and open- 
ended delegations of legislative authority to various regular departments and 
other entities of the federal government. Supplementary law making (rule- 
making) is conducted by many independent and non-independent agencies of 
the federal government, and Congress does not seem to supervise these dele­
gations more closely for one than the other.
Almost without exception the legislation governing the independent com­




























































































istrative Procedures Act does not distinguish between independent and non-in­
dependent agencies either in its provisions for administrative rule making and 
adjudication or its provisions for judicial review. The independent commis­
sions are no more or less independent of the courts than are the non-indepen­
dent ones.
So are we quite sure then that the “independent” in independent regulatory 
commission means and only means independent of the President. We are not 
even sure of that. The legislation establishing the ICC in 1888 and that estab­
lishing most subsequent Commissions did not specify whether the President 
might dismiss commissioners at will before their fixed terms expired. We only 
know retrospectively that Presidents can’t dismiss Commissioners at will 
because the Supreme Court said so in the Humphreys case in 19352. The 
Supreme Court still has not told us whether or when or how the President may 
communicate his policy preferences to the commissions as to the substance of 
their proposed rules or adjudicatory outcomes. (The President may not veto 
the proposed rules of even non-independent agencies because those agencies 
are fulfilling a statutory duty to make such rules.) The President chooses the 
chair of each commission from among the commissioners, and that person 
does serve as chair, but not as a commissioner, at the will of the President.
In short, Congress has always chosen to keep Presidential appointment of 
commissioners (it is not clear that it could constitutionally do otherwise) and 
has itself placed almost no specific limits on Presidential authority over the 
commissions except to provide that no President in one four year term can 
appoint a majority of the commissioners.
That the independent agencies are not at all independent of Congress or the 
courts, or no more independent than other federal agencies, and that their 
independence of the President is so marginal and indeterminate, particularly in 
the actual language of the statutes establishing them, suggests that we will not 
really discover the meaning of “independent” in this context by asking the 
question “independent from whom?” that is independent from what other 
organs of government. Independence, if there be independence, would seem to 
lie along another dimension.




























































































Independence from Partisan Political Control
A clue to that dimension may be found in the fact that the impetus for the 
first independent commission, the ICC, is to be found in Progressivism, an 
American intellectual movement of the late 19th and early 20th Century3. The 
Progressives were reacting to the widespread graft and corruption that marked 
federal, state and local government in that period. That corruption appeared to 
be the result of a deeply rooted American democratic theory and practice. The 
theory was that the affairs of government should be conducted by the people 
themselves not by an elite corps of officials. The practice was that government 
employees had no tenure in office. When a Republican succeeded a Democrat 
as mayor, governor or President, he dismissed all serving government offi­
cials, replacing them with his own party faithful. If a Democrat was next 
elected, the process was repeated in favor of a new round of Democratic gov­
ernment job seekers. “To the victor goes the spoils”. Given the two-party sys­
tem in the US, such Democrat-Republican turn overs should occur fairly fre­
quently so that there would be “rotation in office” (recall the circulation of 
elites of Pareto). This democratic vision of endless Cincinnati stumbling to and 
from the plow had in fact resulted in massive corruption and inefficiency in 
government service.
The Progressive response was to argue that much of government, and cer­
tainly all of public administration, was not about policy choice and thus about 
politics and the demos but was amatter of management and thus about scien­
tific and technological expertise. Those large parts of government should be 
pulled out of politics and placed in the hands of experts. The great monument 
to the Progressives is the Pendleton Act of 1883 which created a neutral, ex­
pert, career civil service for the federal government and the many similar 
state and local statutes enacted in the same period. Other monuments to be 
found particularly in many mid-western and western states where Progressives 
were most influential are “city-manager” systems in which the executive func­
tions of local government are placed in the hands of an expert civil servant 
rather than an elected mayor and non-partisan elections for certain state and 
local office in which the names on the ballot may not carry party designations.
The commission form was surely not invented by the Progressives, but they 
championed that form at many government levels from local sanitation com-
3 For an exhaustive history of the ICC, see I.L. Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce 




























































































missions to manage garbage collection on up to the I.C.C. The commission 
form has obvious anti-corruption benefits, which had been evident to the En­
glish centuries earlier when they put the admiralty “in commission”, and 
which naturally attracted the Progressives. But the commission form had an 
even greater attraction for the Progressives who had, after all, to peddle their 
elitist political theory in a country profoundly committed to democracy. The 
commissioners, either themselves elected or appointed by someone who was 
elected, could serve as a kind of popular or democratic board of directors 
overseeing but not interfering in the day-to-day decisions of expert managers. 
Moreover, the commissions, even though representing the people, could avoid 
the excesses of partisan, party politics either through having the commission­
ers chosen by non-partisan elections or insuring that their membership was 
split between Republicans and Democrats so that neither party could steal the 
spoils.
Thus the appointment and terms of office arrangements for the ICC, which 
appear to be directed against the President, are really much more concerned 
with party partisanship. At any given time commissioners appointed in three 
different four-year presidential terms will be sitting. Given two party compe­
tition in the US, the normal result will be that in any given year the Com­
mission will consist of some Democrats and some Republicans. The point is to 
avoid complete control by a single party. Indeed in setting up the FCC, 
Congress actually specified that no more than a bare majority of the commis­
sions could be from one political party.
Certainly the Commissions were not to be independent of politics. The 
commissioners were selected by exactly the same process as all the standard 
political appointees of the President such as his cabinet officers. The Commis­
sions are not even independent of partisan politics. Congress clearly antici­
pated that party partisanship would carry on to the Commissions. (At state and 
local levels the Progressives did frequently seek to eliminate partisan politics, 
but not democratic politics, by providing for non-partisan election of boards 
and commissions, but the Progressives never achieved non-partisan elections at 
the national level.) What the federal independent regulatory commissions were 
supposed to be independent of was control by one political party. The degree 
of control by the President was left unclear in the statutes because Congress 
was less interested in creating independence from the President as President 
than they were in creating independence from the political party of the Presi­
dent. Where government is extraordinarily intervening in private property 




























































































great political parties be able to manipulate the intervention to its own material 
and ideological advantage.
I have just suggested that the Progressives were more or less reluctantly 
pushed into acknowledging some role for the demos in public administration. 
Progressive commitment to technocratic government nevertheless remained 
deeply rooted. Thus the independent regulatory commissions have always pre­
sented a somewhat paradoxical face. When their existence or their particular 
decisions are being defended either in public or in court, technological legiti­
macy is invariably trotted out. The decisions of the Commissions are defended 
on the ground that they involve complex, technical and thus non-partisan 
questions, to which there are not Republican or Democratic, but only correct 
answers. These decisions are made on the basis of expert evaluation of huge 
bodies of information that only the commissions have the specialized compe­
tence to gather and evaluate. Yet the Commissions are not composed of experts 
but of political appointees whose only claim to special legitimacy is that usu­
ally not all of the commissioners are of the same political party. Of course, 
one is free to view this in either of two ways. Either we have a falling between 
two stools of legitimacy in which democratic and technocratic rationales con­
tradict one another. Or we have the best of both worlds: expert analysis by the 
commissions technocratic staff with sufficient oversight by politically ap­
pointed commissioners to ensure that the experts are “on tap but not on top”.
A Model of Independence
The American experience I have described can be rendered in a rough 
model. Independence itself is essentially a political dimension running to three 
degrees: (1) independence from serving the partisan advantage of one political 
party, (2)independence from partisan party politics, and (3) independence 
from politics. The Commissions, headed by partisan, party politicians, but 
with membership balanced between the two parties, is an example of (1). 
Various state and local boards and commissions filled by nonpartisan elections 
are examples of (2). Various government agencies which, either by statutory 
provision or general expectation, are headed by one or more persons ap­
pointed on the basis of technical qualifications illustrate (3). But most such 
technically headed agencies are not independent. It is expected that the Presi­




























































































economists to the Council of Economic Advisors. The former is an indepen­
dent agency. The latter is not. Indeed the appeal to technological legitimacy is 
less often the basis for establishing an agency independent of politics than a 
justification for establishing an agency of type (1) or type (2), that is an 
agency freed of the normal workings of two party, partisan politics.
While I have concentrated on regulatory agencies, independent agencies 
may be created to pursue other missions. Such agencies are sometimes created 
for largely managerial purposes -  to conduct some ongoing operation. The 
government corporation, established as an essentially private corporation but 
with the government as principal or sole stock holder is one such form with 
many variations of detail designed to create independence from direct political 
supervision. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation and many other gov­
ernment credit operations in the US are prominent examples. Operational in­
dependence is also sometimes achieved through entities like the Tennessee 
Valley Authority, as agency created to manage the construction and operation 
of a complex of government owned dams and power generating stations. But 
the TVA, while not lodged in one of the cabinet departments is not 
“independent” in the legal sense the Commissions are because its head serves at 
the will of the President. The US Postal Service and Amtrac, which operates 
passenger trains, are other examples of the various kinds of management enti­
ties that can be structured with more or less isolation from direct political 
control. For instance, while Postal Service management is essentially au­
tonomous, postal rates are set by Congressional statute. Finally, while regula­
tion to a very large extent, and management invariably to some extent, 
involves public policy making, some independent agencies are established 
whose sole or primary mission is policy making. The Federal Reserve Board 
is the most prominent example. While it performs some regulatory functions, 
and manages a large banking operation, its central significance is as a financial 
policy maker through its influence on interest rates. City planning boards or 
commissions are another example. Typically detailed zoning or land use regu­
lation is done by statute but with provision that a board or commission may 
issue variances or waivers. Such planning entities are usually structured as 
more or less independent agencies.
If we now consider the three degrees of independence and the regulation, 
management and policy making missions, a number of observations are rather 
obvious. For instance, most management activities of government are earned 
on by regular executive agencies. The creation of independent management 




























































































akin to privatization rationales. It is alleged that the government is inherently 
less efficient at a particular operation than non-government would be. For 
example, the most significant activities of the Federal Aviation Agency (which 
is not an independent agency) are airline safety regulation and operation of the 
air traffic control system. The FAA has proven incapable of creating an effi­
cient air traffic control system. It claims that its incapacity is the result of 
cumbersome government procurement regulations that prevent it from pur­
chasing efficiently in an electronics and computer market characterized by 
rapid technical change. The suggestion is now being made that air traffic con­
trol be spun off as some sort of independent or private entity solely for the 
purpose of freeing it from government procurement regulations.
Whether or not to grant government program management entities inde­
pendence depends, however, not only on efficiency arguments but also on the 
degree to which it seems desirable for some special reason to reduce or elimi­
nate the influence on those operations of normal, partisan politics. In a democ­
racy we choose to conduct most of the operations of government democrati­
cally, that is through party, electoral politics. Some degree of independence is 
sometimes chosen as a compromise when Americans cannot decide whether a 
particular operation should be in the public or private sector, as with the 
TVA. Or it may be chosen when the operation is particularly subject to cor­
ruption by partisan politics, such as credit or banking operations or zoning 
variances. Or it may be chosen because some peculiar weakness of government 
renders government operation difficult, as in the air traffic situation. Or, 
invoking the Progressive ideology, it may be chosen because the operation is a 
“purely technical” one in which “politics” should play no part.
Technological Legitimacy and “Information”
This latter rationale, however, is a particularly volatile one and is particu­
larly relevant to the EU. A number of the EU independent agencies, and such 
proposed ones as the statistical agency, are described as essentially information 
gathering agencies. The technological or Progressive rationale is then invoked. 
Information gathering operations are purely managerial not political. They 
involve no discretion. Facts are facts. American experience suggests a more 
complex reality. American statistical agencies have not been independent. The 




























































































departments. Their statistical work is considered purely managerial and 
apolitical until some important issue of public policy turns on, or some 
substantial private or public interest is helped or harmed by, their statistical 
findings. Then their data gathering, procedures of analysis, and findings 
become very much matters of politics. And the long acknowledged technical 
expertise of these agencies does not save them from political attack. In other 
words activities which in the abstract and/or most of the time are perceived as 
nondiscretionary, managerial and technical will be reconstituted in public per­
ception as discretionary and political when they produce results that are signif­
icant to public policy choices or to the clash of political interests. It may be 
argued, of course, that American statis-tical agencies would have been less 
suspect and more sheltered from political controversy had they been indepen­
dent. All that the American experience makes completely clear is that statistics 
like war is seen as far too important to leave to the experts.
The modem world gives us complex information and complex information 
gathering and analysis technologies, technologies that are constantly changing 
and increasingly tuned to uncertainty, risk, probability, and estimation. Under 
such technologies there are likely to be two or more versions of most of the 
information we care about. Clearly information is acentral weapon in most 
contemporary political or policy conflicts. The vision that X will gather and 
present the information to Y who will do the policy making so that X should 
be independent and Y should be political is a curiously mechanical one today. 
Most information gatherers are likely to find that they are indeed studiously 
ignored day after day until one day some bit of information they have gath­
ered becomes politically salient. And it is on that day, when they need it most, 
that their claim to technological detachment will be credited least.
The Independence of Policy Making Agencies 
and Problems of Coordination
Where the mission of an agency is more or less pure policy making, it is 
difficult to see how independence in the form of complete apoliticism through 
direction by technicians can be justified within democratic political cultures. 
For those who believe in democracy, why should any government policy deci­
sions be made undemocratically? Even where, for very peculiar and com­




























































































immediate or even indirect democratic control, in modem polities policies 
almost always interact. In democracies such institutions as parties or cabinet 
governments are intended to coordinate and harmonize the various policies of 
government and failures of coordination are often dearly paid for. To isolate 
one or more policy areas from these coordinating instruments by establishing 
independent policy makers almost insures lack of coordination and its atten­
dant costs. The Federal Reserve Board currently enjoys great favor in the US 
because by luck or skill it appears to have chosen just the right changes in 
interest rates to facilitate the remarkably long, slow growth, relatively low 
unemployment, low inflation economy that the US has been experiencing. But 
in other periods when the US economy has not been doing so well, tensions 
between the President and his Treasury Department and Council of Economic 
Advisors on the one hand and the Board on the other have been acute. 
Presidents have complained bitterly that on the one hand they are held respon­
sible for adopting and implementing acoherent economic policy while one of 
the key elements in such a policy is beyond their control. There has long been 
concern in the US for the coordination problems created by the large number 
of independent agencies in the US. Those problems become particularly acute 
where a central element in government policy is turned over to an independent 
agency.
Independence and Regulation
Independent agencies that regulate privately owned business enterprises are 
a sort of half-way house in a number of respects. As I have already indicated, 
in a nation so devoted to laissez-faire if government could not be kept out of 
business, independence at least kept out partisan political manipulation. More­
over in the creation of most of the regulatory commissions, their managerial 
functions, as opposed to their policy making functions, were stressed. The 
ICC’s central job was setting rail freight rates. This task was presented as a 
purely information gathering, technical nondiscretionary activity. Commission 
accountants would gather from the railroads data on their capital investment 
and operating costs. The financial markets would provide data on the going 
interest rates and returns on various types of investment. From all this data 
setting rates that provided each railroad a reasonable return on investment was 
alleged to be a purely technical, accounting, indeed arithematic task. Getting 




























































































enough to believe that rate setting had no policy dimension, that it did not 
somehow involve balancing the interests of carriers and shippers and of vari­
ous parts of the country. But because management of information seemed 
paramount and policy making secondary, some degree of independence seemed 
appropriate. Indeed the prototypic independent agency in the US has been one 
that regulates private enterprize by means of gathering and analyzing technical 
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Some Further Comments on the American Model
At least in terms of American experience the model proposed here gener­
ates a fair number of instances of agencies in the cell defined by relatively 
complete apoliticism or technocratic legitimacy along the independence di­
mension and managerial along the functional dimension. Most of these are 
government owned or majority share holder corporations or similar entities 
that are conducting particular enterprises that might under slightly different 
circumstances be entire privatized and which essentially provide consumer 
goods and services.
At the other extreme is the cell defined by apoliticsm on the independence 
dimension and policy making on the functional dimension. It takes extremely 
exceptional circumstances to justify nondemocratic policy making in demo­
cratic polities. This cell is rather like constitutionally guaranteed rights. It is 
the announcement by the demos that it does not trust itself and wishes to put 
certain policy questions beyond its own reach. It is one thing, however, to 
place a policy beyond democratic control by the relatively fixed provisions of 
a constitution and quite another to place it in the hands of an agency of gov­
ernment wielding ongoing discretion. It may be argued of course that exclud­
ing a policy from democratic control by constitutional provision in reality is 
also simply placing that policy in the discretion of a government agency 
wielding ongoing discretion, namely whatever court authoritatively interprets 
the constitution. But the movement of policy discretion from the demos to a 
policy making elite is far less obvious when the transfer is to courts by way of 
constitution than when it is to independent agencies.
In this connection the EU proposals for an independent central bank are 
interesting. To the extent that the proposals envision a central bank that actu­
ally exercises discretion over interest rates and monetary and fiscal policy 
more generally, the proposals trigger both democracy and government policy 
coordination concerns echoing those about the Federal Reserve in the US. To 
the extent that the proposals really involve simply an elaborate institutional 
structure for fastening a fixed, high interest rate, low growth, high unem­
ployment policy on the Union indefinitely, then they are actually a kind of 
constitutional amendment creating a Union right to no inflation which, like 
other constitutional rights, takes precedence over such mere policy concerns as 




























































































The cells generated by nonpartisan democracy on the independence dimen­
sion and management and policy making on the functional dimensions are 
rather full of state and local government agencies in the US. These clusters 
represent the distrust of partisan party politics that has swept the US from time 
to time.
Finally the cell defined by avoidance of one party control along the inde­
pendence dimension and regulation along the functional dimension is filled by 
American federal and state regulatory commissions that are the best known 
examples of American independent agencies. They exhibit the least indepen­
dent form of independence, some limited independence of the President but no 
particular independence of Congress or the Supreme Court and only the small 
degree of independence of partisan party politics that come from avoiding to­
tal dominance by one of the two major parties. This intermediate and ambigu­
ous degree of independence results from the convergence of three tensions. 
The first is the American dedication to laissez faire in conflict with the per­
ceived need for regulation. Because we are invoking government only reluc­
tantly at least let it be less than normal government. The second tension arises 
because regulation inevitably is in part management and in part policy making. 
Perhaps management should be separated from normal government but, in a 
democracy, policy shouldn’t usually be. Some politics and some independence 
from politics reflects the mixed managerial-policy functions of regulatory 
agencies. Finally there is the general tension between technocratic and demo­
cratic legitimacy. Some Americans believe some of the time that there are 
some tasks of government that are purely technical and ought to be controlled 
by experts. But all Americans know most of the time that so-called technical 
judgments nearly always harbor some element of policy preference. Thus 
agencies may be somewhat separated from politics because of their exercise of 
technical expertise but not too separated.
Independent Agencies in the EU
So while it is true that in a very few instances Americans have attempted to 
establish agencies or executives defined as purely technical and, therefore al­
most completely divorced from politics, most of the best known of the Ameri­
can independent agencies have been independent in the very special sense of 




























































































parties rather than as being independent of the three great constitutional 
branches.
From this perspective^ US experience may appear entirely irrelevant to the 
EU. For one of the most unique characteristics of the EU is the peripheral role 
of political parties. More broadly. hoa'ever.-American experience might be 
read as an attempt to^partially isolate certain agencies from “normal politics” 
or “the usual politics”. The normal or usual politics of the EU is. of course. 
not party politics but member state polities. Even from this normal politics 
perspective, American style independence may appear irrelevant because the 
organization of the EU independent agencies has invariably incorporated 
management boards that reproduce the member state representation structure 
of the Council itself. In this sense the agencies are less independent of politics 
gs usual than the Commission.
Paradoxically perhaps it turns out that the EU independent agencies are 
much more a matter of Reparation of powers independence and much less^a 
matter of independence of normal politics than are the American. EU inde- 
"pendent agencies are “independent” because they are (partially) independent of 
the Commission not because they are independent of the normaLpartisan poli- 
tics of the EU, that is, intergovernmental politics.
However, before turning to the partial independence from the Commission, 
a further look needs to be taken at the notion that the EU agencies are not in­
dependent of normal intergovernmental EU politics because of the structure of
! their boards. The standard overt rationale for the creation of EU agencies is that they ought to be partially or wholly independent of the Commission be­cause they are “managerial”, perform “technical” tasks or are engaged in “information” gathering and analysis only. In the US it may make sense to say 
that managerial, technical, informational functions should be separated from 
the regular cabinet departments or ministries because those departments are 
part of the Executive Branch which is political, because it is headed by a 
democratically elected president. This is the get-technology-out-of-politics 
theme. But the separation of powers in the European Unionis_entirelv differ- 
_ en tjh e  Commossi.on-Council_sepa.ration is itself a supposed, separation of 
technocracy (the Commission) from intergovernmental politics (the Council!.
sepa-
_ _____ _________ .________  is the
assertion that the technical ought to be separated from the technical.
Therefore, to assert a managerial-technical-informational rationale for 




























































































Is all this managerial-technical-informational talk simply asmoke screen for 
the more fundamental argument that, because Europeans don’t like the tech­
nocrats in Brussels and fear concentrating even more governance there, if we 
want more EU technocrats, we need to split them up and scatter them about 
Europe? I think the answer to this question is largely yes but not entirely.
A second motive is, I believe, a kind of “neo functionalism”. If currently 
direct routes to further political integration of the Union are blocked then, 
following Haass’ old arguments about the World Health Organization and the 
U.N., further growth can be achieved indirectly through the proliferation of 
small, limited jurisdiction, allegedly “technical agencies” that will appear polit­
ically innocuous. That is why it is not enough to say that the agencies are not 
in Brussels. It must also be said that they are merely technical or informa­
tional.
A third motive really is about technocracy. The member state composed 
management boards were a political necessity no doubt. But by stressing the 
technical and informational functions of these agencies, by making each highly 
specialized to a particular technology and by incorporating large components 
of scientific personnel, there is undoubtedly the hope that the technocrats will 
take over these agencies from the politicians. And the technocrats for each of 
these agencies, it is hoped will create Europe-wide epistemic communities 
whose technical truths transcend intergovernmental politics. As Americans say 
“there is no Republican or Democratic way to pave a street”, Europeans may 
be able to say there is no French or Greek way. Thus, while the proffered 
technocratic rationales do not really explain why the agencies should be inde­
pendent of the Commission, they do explain why the agencies should each take 
a small slice of allegedly technical-informational activity. That kind of organi­
zation is most likely, over time, to assure the internal dominance within each 
agency of its technocrats over its national politicians.
The fundamental argument for FT I independent agencies_may- well_be_that, 
given the current state of the EU. the only road-toward-further-positive de­
velopment is the proliferation of-govemment functionS-QUtside of Brussels 
prescribed-jadth atechnological-informatioBal sedative^tP—rampanLantUEU
sentiment. If this is the argument, American experience is hardly relevant on 
the benefits side. Whether this route will or will not achieve EU growth and, 
indeed whether further EU growth is desirable now or ever, are hardly 
American questions. On the cost side, however, American experience may be 





























































































The first of these dimensions is coordination. The United States has over a 
hundred years of experience at creating independent regulatory commissions 
one at a time, each on pragmatic grounds, each with relatively narrow compe­
tencies, each allegedly without policy discretion. The ultimate American result 
has been continuing complaints of a “headless fourth branch of government” 
and grave concerns about piecemeal diversions of policy making from overall 
Presidential coordination4. The total size of the sector of governance that has 
escaped the regular government has turned out to be fairly large. More impor­
tant, the independent pieces tend to overlap and interact with the policy mak­
ing of the regular government so that incoherence of government policy is al­
ways a risk.
A response that the EU agencies are informational only and not regulatory 
and so do not present problems of policy coordination is not entirely satisfac­
tory for a number of reasons. Most importantly, at least three of the EU 
agencies, Harmonizational, Medical Products, and Plant Registration, are 
clearly regulatory and calling them “technical” does not make them less regu­
latory. Each grants or withholds an extremely valuable economic right to a 
private enterprise in furtherance of a public policy. It is indicative that, while 
constantly asserting that “technical” decisions are “non-discretionary”, the 
Harmonization Agency was created with a trademark appeals board -  a clear 
indication that no one expected trademark decisions to go uncontroverted. 
Clearly the creation of this appeals board reflects the experience of trademark 
lawyers that, while trademark decisions are about “technical” matters, there is 
often “technical” evidence and argument on both sides and ultimate decision is, 
to some degree, discretionary and to some degree based in public policy 
grounds.) Moreover, I will try to argue in a moment that even the 
“informational” functions of agencies have policy dimensions of key impor­
tance that raise policy coordination issues.
It could be argued that coordination problems will not be raised by the EU ^ 
agencies because each is governed by an intergovernmental board. Given that 
each board has representatives of each member state, coordination will be
4 This concern for coordination is reflected in a whole series of Presidential reports. Con­
gressional hearings and academic writings. For an introduction to these materials, see H. 
Linde, G. Bunn, F. Paff and W. Church, Legislative and Administrative Processes, 2nd 




























































































achieved by the usual intergovernmental routes. That is, the French cabinet 
government system will assure that the French member(s) of agency X will 
favor policies coordinated with those favored by the French member(s) of 
agency Y. Such coordination through member state governments is problem­
atic, however, for two reasons. First, national governments are not usually as 
successful as in theory they ought to be at coordinating the policies of their 
own ministries and, of course, different national ministries will direct the na­
tional members of different EU agencies. Second, in many instances policy 
issues will arise at EU levels before they have solidified and been coordinated 
at national levels. National governments cannot easily coordinate their posi­
tions on policy X and Y when they, as yet, have no such positions.
Moreover, the very emphasis on scientific and technological expertise in the 
agencies poses potential coordination problems. Experts by definition are spe­
cialists who devote “more and more” of their lives to “less and less” because 
modem knowledge is so large and complex that expertise can only be gained' 
by any one person over a small part of itTThus scientific and technological ex­
perts exhibit the most classical deformation professionnel. By the very nature 
of their lives, they assign a far higher priority to some very small arena than 
any of the rest of us would or than we would collectively. A forest turns out to 
be a series of entirely different places to the timber manager, recreation spe­
cialist, fire control specialist, fish and wild life expert, highway engineer, wa­
ter quality monitor, range manager, wilderness enthusiast and land use plan­
ner. They quite literally do not see the same thing when they look at the trees. 
The attempt of the US Forest Service to generate multi-use forest plans has 
been a, so far, unending story of inability to resolves conflicts among experts. 
The expertise of agencies has a kind of multiplier effect on the independence 
of agencies in generating a potential for conflict.
Problems of Legitimacy
The second major future cost that independent agencies might generate in­
volves legitimacy. To the extent that the independent agency movement is a 
device for countering public disaffection with the Commission, the move is 
paradoxical on the legitimacy dimension. It seeks to respond to public disillu­
sion with one technocracy by the creation of many more. The Union may in­
deed suffer from some kind of “democracy deficit”. But the whole Western 




























































































ment. Anti-Commission public sentiment is not simply a discrete and unique 
Community phenomenon. Rather it is one among many symptoms of a general 
Western reaction to technology and technocracy. Other symptoms include the 
Green Party, many facets of the environmental movement, many facets of the 
deregulation movement, the many “agency forcing” and “technology forcing” 
provisions of recent major US legislation and the strong anti-technocratic 
themes sounded in the last French presidential elections.J t  is true that episodes 
of political party corruption and breakdown_such as jhe recent ones in Italy 
and Japan may engender calls for “governments of experts’T-huusuch calls 
should not mislead us as to the relative legitimacy of technocracy and democ­
racy. Today’s “experts” are tomorrow’s “bureaucrats”. Today’s “politicians” 
are tomorrow’s leaders of their countries.
On a broader front we mav speak of the “li 
emments or the general Western withdrawal
institutional hierarchies of all kinds. Jfte  point is that curing weak democrat!c 
legitimacy by a move to technocratic (and thus obviously elite) legitimacy has 
a certain “out of the frying pan into the firelLasnect.
I have already argued that dressing technocracy in the garb of 
“information” and thus attempting to denature its political significance is not 
necessarily a winning strategy because, as soon as information becomes highly 
relevant to policy outcomes, the information and the information gatherers 
cease to be defined by the public as neutral and objective and are redefined as 
part of the political struggle. In general, when we are now talking about “the 
information society” and the “power” of information, and when political par­
ties, interest groups and individuals spend billions of dollars on informational 
political campaigning, it is hard to maintain the vision some kind of clear dis­
junction between information and politics or policy making. Contemporary 
politics is a politics of information. The politics and policy making of envi­
ronmental, health and safety regulation, energy, international trade, the seas, 
global warming, tobacco regula-tion, nuclear proliferation, privatization, etc. 
are arenas in which scientific and technological information battles are central 
to political outcomes. To say that an agency only provides information, that it 
neither makes nor enforces policy, is in a certain sense incomprehensible in 
the conditions of modem politics. Is there really no enforcement dimension 
when an agency provides the “information” that vehicular emissions are the 
cause of 90% of the excess of air pollution over the legal standard set for pol­
lution in a given area? Is there really no policy making dimension to the 




























































































den. If scientific information is not a crucial form of politics, then the tobacco 
industry has certainly been foolish in spending the billions it has on “research” 
over the years.
Aside from this general point, there are three structural factors that make it 
difficult to maintain a separation between information and policy making. 
First, we simply cannot do all research about everything. We cannot gather 
and analyze all information. We must have research and analysis agendas. 
What research we do determines what policies we make. What policies we 
wish to make determines what research we do. In this way information agen­
cies are always policy agencies.
Secondly, in the modem corporate capitalist world, private enterprize al­
ways knows more than public and has considerable capacity to hide and ma­
nipulate what it knows to its own advantage. If we respond to corporate capi­
talism by government regulation, then public “information” agencies are nec­
essarily deeply involved in regulatory politics and deeply involved on the side 
of the regulators against the regulated. Much of government’s current invest­
ment in data gathering and analysis is devoted to evening up its information 
resources with those of the private sector. Information is a crucial tool of both 
regulatory policy making and enforcement. It is hard to see how a government 
agency gathering information about the performance and impact of regulated 
enterprises can be kept separate from regulatory politics particularly when the 
resistance of the regulated to regulation will frequently take the form of chal­
lenging the information presented by the regulator.
Moreover, the dominance of many regulated industries in the support of the 
very scientific and technical research and analysis crucial to their regulation 
creates situations in which government agencies devoted to information are 
peculiarly vulnerable to capture. If all of the first line pharmaceutical research 
chemists work for the drug industry, then a government agency devoted to 
drug information will gather whatever information the industry chooses. Such 
capture, real or suspected, tends to bring the politics of information to public 
attention. Where government regulates, information is hard to keep clear from 
regulatory politics.
Thirdly most new laws are not really new but amendments to existing laws. 
Most new government programs are not new but incremental changes in exist­
ing programs. Thus much of the information relevant to governance is feed 




























































































new information and having done so create new programs and policies based 
on that information. For the most part government is already running pro­
grams. In the course of doing so it receives a lot of information from the ben­
eficiaries and/or targets of the programs concerning their successes and fail­
ures. No one knows more about a government program or policy than the 
government agency operating or implementing the program or policy because 
the agency is the natural focus of complaints about it. Government programs 
and policies are altered on the basis of this end use information. Although one 
might somehow conceive a pure information agency that did no operation or 
implementation, one cannot at all conceive of pure operators or implementers 
who do no information gathering and analysis. Thus if we set up pure infor­
mation agencies, we are bound to create information rivalries between those 
agencies and operating agencies. To the extent that conflicts are engendered 
between information agency information and operating agency information, 
we have not only a coordination problem but a legitimacy problem. For noth­
ing more quickly delegitimates technocrat legitimacy than government experts 
announcing mutually contradictory bodies of information.
If the independent agency argument is that information = technical expertise 
outside of politics = technocracy = a non- democratic legitimacy, then the re­
sponse is that information is not technical but political and that technocracy is, 
these days, not perceived by the public as very legitimate.
Problems of Control
We have looked at potential costs of coordination and legitimacy. The third 
potential cost of independent agencies lies in the area of control. Although the 
American separation of powers system is not necessarily always a zero sum 
game in which more power to one branch means less to another and vice 
versa, it sometimes operates that way. One way to look at the situation of the 
independent regulatory commission is that, because Congress delegated to 
them a substantial quantum of its law making authority, it sought to reduce 
levels of Presidential control and so increase its own relative degree of con­
trol. For it is noteworthy that in setting them up, Congress somewhat freed 
them from Presidential control but made them no more independent of 
Congress and the federal courts than are the nonindependent agencies. In the 
context of delegated legislation, American courts act as a watchdog for 




























































































accord with the parent legislation of Congress establishing the delegation. Thus 
maintaining judicial review control of the independent agencies actually main­
tains rather than reduces Congressional control. On the other hand because 
Congress and the President exercise rival influence on the agencies’ budgets 
and rival influence on their policy initiatives, weakening Presidential control 
of independent agencies does strengthen Congressional control.
In assessing Congressional control, attention must be paid as much to the ab­
solute as to the relative control powers of Congress. Congress exercises far 
more control over all agencies, independent and otherwise, than do most 
democratic legislatures. First of all, while the theory is the reverse, legisla­
tures have a potential for greater control of agencies in presidential than in 
parliamentary systems. At least where party discipline can be maintained, in 
parliamentary systems the theoretical legislative control of administration 
through cabinet government actually turns into cabinet control of the parlia­
ment in favor of the ministries. The cabinet, composed of the leaders of the 
majority party or parliamentary coalition in parliament, and also composed of 
the heads of the ministries, orders its party subordinates in the legislature to 
do what they are told under the threat of ageneral election at which their seats 
are at risk and loss of the party label which is essential to their reelection. In 
presidential systems the political executive has no such control over the legisla­
ture. It may vote against the President’s policy proposals or budget without 
provoking a general election and, of course, the President is not necessarily 
the head of the majority party or parties in the legislature. Moreover in the 
American presidential system, party discipline is extremely weak. Even when 
the President is of the majority Congressional party, he cannot control its 
votes.
Added to these general features of American separation of powers, is a par­
ticular feature that the American Congress has long enjoyed, and also suffered 
from, a peculiarly strong committee system. Congress has created an elaborate 
system of highly specialized standing committees and sub-committees with as- 
trong element of self-selection and substantial professional staff resources. 
Members interested in a particular policy subject matter sit for extended peri­
ods of time on a committee that is devoted to that subject matter, has a staff 
which is expert in that subject matter and maintains continuity of control over 
the agencies handling that subject matter. Actually four Congressional commit­
tees or subcommittees oversee each agency, aSenate and a House committee re­
sponsible for legislation in the agency’s jurisdiction and a Senate and House 




























































































poses budget figures for each agency, including the independent ones, 
Congress may, and very often does, change those figures either upward or 
downward. While the President accompanies each proposal for new legislation 
made by any agency, independent or otherwise, with a statement of his own 
position, the Congress passes or refuses to pass whatever versions of the pro­
posed legislation it pleases. Congress exercises both these powers largely 
through its specialized committees.
As a result when Congress is interested in what either an independent or 
nonindependent agency is up to, it can and does find out in very great detail 
what the agency is doing and plans to do. Both through arduous committee 
hearings guided by its staff whose expertise rivals that of the agencies and 
which can and does tap further expertise from the private sector, and through 
continuous direct contact between individual committee members and agency 
officials, an agency can be subjected to extremely detailed oversight and given 
extremely detailed instruction on what the committees want. And if the 
committees do not get what they want in year one, the result will be extremely 
uncomfortable budget hearings and perhaps an extremely uncomfortable bud­
get for the agency in year two and, by about year three, amendments the 
agency does not want to the legislation that defines its structure and missions. 
Keeping Congress happy is as important as keeping the President happy to 
most agencies and is more important to the independent agencies. (It must be 
emphasized, however, that political salience is always the crucial question. 
Most of the time neither Congress nor the President pays much attention to 
most of the things most of the independent agencies do.)
No such legislative control will exist for the foreseeable future over the EU 
independent agencies. Under current arrangements in those instances where 
EU independent agencies actually make regulatory decisions, those decisions 
finally lie with the Commission and sometimes with the Council. In those 
instances it may certainly be claimed that adequate control exists. Para­
doxically, however, it is where the agencies are providing “information” only 
that this variety of control collapses. That is both the Commission and the 
Council may find themselves confronted by agency announced “information” 
that markedly constrains the policy options open to them without having had 
any way of controlling the production of that information.
The central mode of control of the EU agencies is, of course, the national 
representation on their management boards. It may be argued that Commission 




























































































control is irrelevant because a microcosm of Council control is established 
within each agency. The continuing force of this argument depends upon the 
degree to which the expert staffs and advisors of the highly specialized 
“informational” “technical” agencies coopt the boards so that they become 
conveyors to the member states of the policy consensuses arrived at by com­
munities of expertise rather than member state controllers of that expertise. If 
one were of a suspicious disposition one might believe that the member state 
management board device common to the agencies is intended, at least by some 
proponents of agencies, to begin as the latter and eventually turn into the for­
mer. Indeed for neo-functionalists planning to build the Union by building the 
agencies that must be the ultimate hope.
In any event it is clear that EU independent agencies are independent in the 
sense of being relatively free of control by any of the other organs of the 
Community. This absence of control will be considered more or less of a 
problem depending on the degree to which one believes that the agencies will 
be purely “informational” and that information somehow lies outside of the 
politics of policy making.
Conclusion and Proposal
The proliferation and expansion of agencies is fairly clearly a strategy for 
growing the Union by evading the current popular hostility to the Commis­
sion. Often in politics the best way to go is to seek the short term, and thus 
fairly certain, benefits and ignore the long term, and therefore far less certain, 
costs. The short term benefits of the proliferation of agencies may be great 
and may carry the Union over a period of what otherwise would be doldrums. 
The long term potential cost of lack of coordination, it might well be argued, 
should simply be ignored for the moment. It may be better to create such a- 
problem than to have no growth of Union policies that eventually need coordi­
nation. Coordination mechanisms may be invented when the need arises. Simi­
larly control problems are ameliorated for the moment by the arrangements 
for passing actual regulatory decisions to the Commission and Council and the 
structure of the management boards. Long term control problems may be 
ameliorated by further development of the European Parliament.
Legitimacy problems are more serious perhaps, because they are more im­




























































































formation” and “technical decisions” on the one hand and policy initiation and 
implementation on the other can be successfully maintained for very long. 
Sooner or later, and more likely sooner, situations will arise that will make it 
clear that information constrains decisions about what policies are or are not 
to be initiated and when initiated policies are to be implemented. It will be­
come equally clear that very often policy initiators and implementors are 
crippled unless they can direct what information will be gathered when. The 
technical becomes political when it becomes policy relevant and in the modem 
world most policies turn on whether one version or another of “information” 
is accepted.
When the politics of information becomes clear, will technocratic rationales
------------ -------- —--------—— ------------ - - - ■  — -  ----------------- -— -—   ——    ~  ------- --
be strong enough to establish the legitimacy of the agencies. I personally be­
lieve not. My own view is that popular faithJn technology and particularly in 
technocracy is at a very low ebb.. If indeed-i.i-is.the.low legitimacy of thélCom- 
mission that fuels the move to_agencies. why should we .expect .that the same 
appeal to technocratic legitimacy that-failed the Commission will succeed for 
die agencies?
ne positive response to the legitimacy prohIermnight-be.to .pay heed to the
c lor fo r transparency and partic ipation in govemmp.nt~that-Ls_heardji11 
around the world The C ouncil-C om m issinn-rnm ilnlngy prnrpcc is am ong rhp 
least transparent poliev m aking processes in the dem ocratic w orld. And, while 
the com itology process is in a sense highly participatory, it is am ong the most 
unequally  participatory  in the dem ocratic «¿acid—Spm e-m ierests participant 
heavily. O thers are nearly excluded.
If proliferation of independent agencies is to be the next mode of growth 
for the Union, then perhaps they could become an opportune vehicle for en­
hancing transparency and participation in Union affairs. In one sense the mere 
existence of fixed agencies of defined structure and jurisdiction is an improve­
ment in transparency over the comitology process. Perhaps more ways could 
be found to introduce transparency and participation into the internal proc­
esses of the new agencies and thus increase-theinperceivetLlegitimacv. But 
such moves will actually be hampered to the extent that we try to build the 
legitimacy of the agencies by insisting that “information” and “technical deci­
sions” somehow lie in a cradle of scientific harmony above and beyond the 
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